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strued its statute, "while being transported . . . in or upon said
motor vehicle,"' x holding that a plaintiff injured while standing beside the vehicle after alighting is not barred from recovery." The
seemingly inconsistent holdings in these cases have in most part been
due to the diverse wording of the several guest statutes and the rules
of statutory construction that have been applied.
In the instant case the Florida Court has reached a decision consistent with its own statute and with the decisions of other jurisdictions having similarly worded statutes. If the feeling that gratuitous
passengers should not recover from the obliging hostl2 and the prevention of collusive suits 3 are sufficient grounds for the existence of
the guest statute, it should make no difference that the passenger is
temporarily outside the car when injured. The acts of both plaintiff
and defendant in the instant case were incidental to the transportation.
The fact that the plaintiff momentarily stepped from the car to open
the gate should not alter the guest relationship, in that the transportation originally contemplated was not completed.
W.

HENRY BARBER, JR.

WILLS: INTENT AS AN ELEMENT OF ADEMPTION
Eisenchenk v. Fowler, 82 So.2d 876 (Fla. 1955)
By a will executed in 1953 testator devised to his niece and nephew
a house located in Illinois. Subsequently he sold the property to the
devisees on a contract of sale that provided for the unpaid installments
to be secured by a mortgage. After testator's death the devisees brought
suit against the executor of the estate, claiming that the property
descended to them through the will. The lower court held that the
property did not pass by the will and that plaintiffs were obligated to
pay the unpaid balance of the contract. On appeal, rEL, the property did not pass under the will; by testator's sale of the property he
10OHio GEN. CODE ANN. §6308-6

(1945).

"Eshelman v. Wilson, 83 Ohio App. 395, 80 N.E.2d 803 (1948).
"2Koger v. Hollahan, 144 Fla. 779, 198 So. 685 (1940); 4 BLASHFiELB, CYCLOPEDIA
OF AUTOMOBi.E LAW AND PRACTICE §2292 (perm. ed.); PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF ToRTs 77 (2d ed. 1955); Note, 4 U. FLA. L. REv. 79 (1951).
13PRossM, op. cit. supra note 12; Note, 4 U. FLA. L. REv. 79 (1951).
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manifested an intent that the devise should be adeemed.
A specific bequest or devise is a testamentary gift of particularly
designated property and can be satisfied only by receipt of the specific
property.' Ademption occurs when a specific devise or bequest fails
because the particular property is either not in existence or not in
the estate at the time of testator's death. 2
When the property is no longer in existence there is clearly an
ademption; but when there has been a change in the identity of the
property, or the testator has exchanged it for similar property, courts
differ as to whether the specific devise or bequest has been adeemed.
A majority of the courts 3 follow the test set forth by Lord Thurlow,
which, disregarding the testator's intent, looks only to see if the thing
given remains in the estate.4 Thus, these courts state that a mere
change in form of the subject matter will not work an ademption'
but that a change in substance will adeem the gift. 6 Intent of the
testator is considered irrelevant, since the issue is not whether the
testator sought to modify the will but whether there is an object upon
which the will can operate. A minority of courts7 hold that whether
there has been an ademption depends upon the intent of the testator;
the basis for this view is the general rule that intent governs testamentary interpretation.
The Florida Supreme Court in past decisions had aligned itself
with the majority view. In Hurt v. Davidson8 the testatrix, subsequent
'Howe v. Howe's Ex'x, 287 Ky. 756, 155 S.W.2d 196 (1941); Beatty v. Hottenstein,
380 Pa. 607, 112 A.2d 397 (1955).
2ATKiNSON, WiLts 741 (2d ed. 1953).
3E.g., In re Brann, 219 N.Y. 263, 114 N.E. 404 (1916); Ametrano v. Downs, 170
N.Y. 388, 63 N.E. 340 (1902).
4Stanley v. Potter, 2 Cox 180, 182, 30 Eng. Rep. 83, 84 (1789).
5E.g., Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Young, 101 Conn. 359, 125 Atl. 871 (1924)
(testator received a greater number of shares of stock of lower par value); Curtis
v. Curtis, 23 Del. Ch. 27, 2 A.2d 88 (1938) (reorganized corporation issued new
bonds for old ones); Goode v. Reynolds, 208 Ky. 441, 271 SAV. 600 (1925) (shares
in consolidated bank issued to replace shares in old bank); Spinney v. Eaton, 111
Me. 1, 87 Ad. 378 (1913) (bonds issued upon redemption of stock); Hankey v.
French, 281 Mich. 454, 275 N.W. 206 (1937) (change in partnership asset caused
by withdrawal of one partner and change of name).
6E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Perkins Inst., 275 Mass. 498, 176 N.E. 532 (1931) (bonds
issued to stockholders of bank upon recall of stock); Horn's Estate, 317 Pa. 49,
175 AtI. 414 (1934) (new stock issued upon merger of corporations).
7E.g., Joynes v. Hamilton, 99 Md. 665, 57 At. 25 (1904); Donath v. Shaw, 132
N.J. Eq. 595, 22 A.2d 555 (1942); Gensimore's Estate, 246 Pa. 216, 92 At. 134 (1914).
8130 Fla. 822, 178 So. 556 (1937).
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to executing a will devising her house and lot, conveyed the property
and purchased another house in the same town. The provision in
the will gave "my niece and (namesake) Josephine May, my house and
lot in Bowling Green, Florida.",, From this language the Court might
have found that it was the testator's intent that her will pass the subsequently acquired house and lot. The Court held, however, that
the property could not be the subject of the specific devise, which
was therefore adeemed:10
"[Tihere was no ambiguity as to the property which was intended to be conveyed by item 4 of the will and when that
property was sold and conveyed by the testatrix subsequent to
the execution of the will there was nothing left in the property
of the testatrix to which that item of the will could apply."
It was unnecessary to resort to the testator's intent in the instant
case. Cases following the majority view, which the Florida Supreme
Court heretofore has adopted, have held that when an owner who
has executed a will devising certain property thereafter sells the
property, taking back a mortgage as security, there is an ademption.11
Since the minority position invites confusion and uncertainty in
proof of intent,1 2 it is suggested that the Court should reaffirm its adherence to the majority view and thus limit the importance of the
intent language in the Eisenchenck case.
JAMES

W.

RABE

DId. at 823, 178 So. at 556.
'old. at 829, 178 So. 559; see also In re Vail's Estate, 67 So.2d 665, 669 (Fla.
1953) (dictum).
"Moncrief v. Shuman, 169 Ga. 217, 150 S.E. 98 (1929); Willoughby v. Watson,
114 Kan. 82, 216 Pac. 1095 (1923); Emery v. Union Soc'y, 79 Me. 334, 9 At. 891
(1887); Walker v. Waters, 118 Md. 203, 84 At. 466 (1912).
12See Elwyn v. DeGarmendia, 148 Md. 109, 128 At. 913 (1925).
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